Bank Competition, Crisis and Risk-Taking: Evidence from Emerging Markets in Asia by Soedarmono, Wahyoe et al.
Bank Competition, Crisis and Risk-Taking: Evidence
from Emerging Markets in Asia
Wahyoe Soedarmono, Fouad Machrouh, Amine Tarazi
To cite this version:
Wahyoe Soedarmono, Fouad Machrouh, Amine Tarazi. Bank Competition, Crisis and Risk-
Taking: Evidence from Emerging Markets in Asia. 2012. <hal-00918500>
HAL Id: hal-00918500
https://hal-unilim.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00918500
Submitted on 16 Dec 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633394
1 
 
Bank competition, crisis and risk-taking:  
Evidence from emerging markets in Asia 
 
 
Wahyoe Soedarmono1 , Fouad Machrouh2, Amine Tarazi 3, *, a  
 
1 World Bank, EASPR, Jakarta, Indonesia  
2 Institut Supérieur de Commerce et d'Administration des Entreprises, Casablanca, Morocco  
3 Université de Limoges, LAPE, Limoges, France 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the impact on financial stability of bank competition in emerging 
markets by taking into account crisis periods. Based on a broad set of commercial banks in 
Asia over the 1994-2009 period, the empirical results indicate that a higher degree of market 
power in the banking market is associated with higher capital ratios, higher income volatility 
and higher insolvency risk of banks. In general, although banks in less competitive markets 
hold more capital, the levels of capitalization are not high enough to offset the impact on 
default risk of higher risk taking. Nevertheless, during crisis periods, specifically the 1997 
Asian crisis that has directly affected Asian banks, market power in banking has a stabilizing 
impact. A closer investigation however shows that such findings only hold for countries with 
a smaller size of the largest banks, suggesting that the impact of bank competition is 
conditional on the extent to which the banking industry may benefit from too-big-to-fail 
subsidies. Overall, this paper has policy implications for bank consolidation policies and the 
role of the lender of last resort. 
 
JEL Classification: G21, G28  
Keywords: bank competition, moral hazard, financial crisis, Asia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
*Coresponding author. Tel: +33-555-14-92-05 
a
 E-mail addresses: wsoedarmono@worldbank.org, fmachrouh@groupeiscae.ma, amine.tarazi@unilim.fr. The 
contents of this paper are the sole responsibility of the author and can under no circumstances be regarded as 
reflected the position of the World Bank, its executive directors or countries they represent.  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633394
 2 
 
Bank competition, crisis and risk-taking:  
Evidence from emerging markets in Asia  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the impact on financial stability of bank competition in emerging 
markets by taking into account crisis periods. Based on a broad set of commercial banks in 
Asia over the 1994-2009 period, the empirical results indicate that a higher degree of market 
power in the banking market is associated with higher capital ratios, higher income volatility 
and higher insolvency risk of banks. In general, although banks in less competitive markets 
hold more capital, the levels of capitalization are not high enough to offset the impact on 
default risk of higher risk taking. Nevertheless, during crisis periods, specifically the 1997 
Asian crisis that has directly affected Asian banks, market power in banking has a stabilizing 
impact. A closer investigation however shows that such findings only hold for countries with 
a smaller size of the largest banks, suggesting that the impact of bank competition is 
conditional on the extent to which the banking industry may benefit from too-big-to-fail 
subsidies. Overall, this paper has policy implications for bank consolidation policies and the 
role of the lender of last resort. 
 
JEL Classification: G21, G28  
Keywords: bank competition, moral hazard, financial crisis, Asia 
 3 
1. Introduction 
 Since the end of the eighties, financial liberalization aiming to enhance financial sector 
competition has raised concerns for both researchers and policy makers. In countries with 
bank-based financial systems, financial liberalization is expected to create more efficient 
banking markets with lower cost of borrowing for entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, the 
externalities stemming from an increase in bank competition remain an open question and the 
occurrence of banking crises in both developing and developed countries over the last three 
decades has cast doubts on the role of competition in banking. Consequently, the relationship 
between bank competition and stability remains a widely debated and controversial issue. 
This paper aims to revisit and extend the nexus between bank competition and 
stability, particularly from the perspective of emerging economies with bank-based financial 
systems that have experienced financial crises. Indeed, a great number of studies have 
extensively examined the link between competition and risk in banking, but only few works 
have been dedicated to emerging economies. Furthermore, to our knowledge no study has 
investigated the impact of financial crises on the link between competition and stability in 
banking.  
The occurrence of financial crises is an important dimension in the competition-
stability nexus in banking because crises could directly modify market competitiveness as 
well as bank behavior in terms of risk taking. Financial crises have also spawned several 
banking reforms such as capitalizations and consolidations that might in turn alter the degree 
of competition and moral hazard in banking. Therefore, assessing the link between 
competition and the risk behavior of banks should take crises into account to control for 
various factors that might affect the link.  
For such purposes, this paper focuses on the Asian banking industry for several 
reasons. First, Asian countries have undergone dramatic changes from expansionary financial 
 4 
liberalization in 1980s to a severe crisis in 1997 and again, have experienced rapid growth of 
financial globalization in the 21st century (Cook, 2009; Moshirian, 2008). Second, banking 
stability remains an important issue in both academic and policy circles in Asia, as banking is 
the predominant source of finance for private sector businesses in Asian countries (Adams, 
2008). Yet, private sector businesses in Asia also remain vulnerable, where poor accounting 
standards, non-transparent management practices, and a governance system with weak 
protections for minority shareholders remain in the post-Asian crisis (Park, 2006). This 
corporate vulnerability can in turn deteriorate bank stability through risk-shifting mechanisms 
as highlighted by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
Moreover, the characteristics of competition, crises and reforms in Asian banking are 
particularly relevant for the purpose of our study. The unsupervised financial liberalization of 
the 1980s has resulted in stronger competition on the credit market, particularly in real estate 
markets (Sachs and Woo, 2000). This in turn was perceived as the origin of the 1997 Asian 
crisis. In response to the 1997 Asian crisis, financial reforms in the form of bank 
capitalizations and consolidations that might affect bank competition have also been widely 
implemented1.  
 With regards to bank consolidations, Asian countries have shown a remarkable trend. 
They have experienced a rapid growth of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) with a 
growth rate reaching 25% per year as of 2003 (Santoso, 2009). Such consolidations have led 
to the emergence of large banks and are likely to alter the degree of competition in banking, 
but whether these developments resulted in higher or lower bank stability remains unexplored, 
particularly during crisis periods. 
In the meantime, bank consolidations could exacerbate “too-big-to-fail” effects, 
increasing risk-taking incentives through “gamble for resurrection” strategies to exploit state 
                                                 
1
 See Williams and Nguyen (2005) and Klingebiel et al (2001) for further discussion on several financial reforms 
in Asian countries. 
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bailouts and to transfer losses from shareholders to the taxpayers. Some Asian countries 
experienced such kinds of bank moral hazard behavior during the 1997 Asian crisis (Cook, 
2009). Although bank consolidations exacerbate the "too-big-to-fail" issues in banking, such 
policies were often followed during crisis periods to restore domestic banks‟ financial 
strength. Furthermore, foreign participation in bank consolidations in the post-1997 Asian 
crisis was also common in Asia. William and Nguyen (2005) point out that the time period 
following the 1997 Asian crisis was characterized by substantial changes in the Asian banking 
industry encompassing bank restructuring programs and widened access to foreign ownership. 
Domanski (2005) further documents that during 2001-2005, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 
particularly cross-border M&As involving banks in Third World countries, increased 
significantly to US$ 67.5 billion (from only US$ 2.5 billion during 1991-1995). Asia has thus 
become the second largest recipient of cross-border bank M&A after Latin America and 
accounts for 36 percent of total bank M&A values. Jeon et al. (2011) further document that 
the average assets held by foreign banks in Asia and Latin America increased from 26% in 
1997 to 38% after five years. In Asia, such an increase is different from one country to 
another, where South Korea and Indonesia exhibit the largest foreign participation rate. 
On the whole, our focus on the Asian banking industry enables us to investigate 
important factors affecting the link between bank competition and stability that have not been 
considered in the previous literature. Specifically, our main goal is to investigate whether the 
impact of market power in the banking industry on bank risk taking behavior changes during 
crisis periods and thus, we provide a benchmark for policy makers in emerging economies 
regarding banking reforms such as consolidations, foreign participations and bank 
capitalization.  In addition, we also investigate whether bank moral hazard stemming from 
too-big-to-fail policies, particularly during crisis periods, might alter the nexus between 
competition and stability in banking.  
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In this paper, we specifically consider the 1994-2009 period and a broad set of 
commercial banks in Asian countries that have been directly affected by the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. These include Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea that were 
severely devastated by the banking crisis, as well as China, India, Hong Kong, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam that were less affected. Our sample also covers the 2008 
global credit crisis triggered in the US.  
 Our results indicate that a higher degree of market power in the banking industry is 
associated with higher bank capital ratios, higher risk taking, but also higher bank insolvency 
risk. Hence, although banks in less competitive markets hold more capital, the levels of 
capitalization are not high enough to offset the impact on default risk of higher risk taking. 
Furthermore, our findings also show that during crisis periods, specifically the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis that has directly affected Asian banks, higher market power has the opposite 
effect. In other words, lower competition in the banking industry has a destabilizing effect in 
general but a stabilizing impact during crisis periods. A closer look shows that our findings 
are conditional to the extent to which countries are locked in more or less important “too-big-
to-fail” policies because of the size of their largest banks.  
 The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review on 
the relationship between bank market power and bank stability. Section 3 describes the data, 
variables and provides descriptive statistics. Section 4 highlights the econometric 
specification and methodology used in this paper. Section 5 discusses our empirical findings, 
while Section 6 provides a broad set of sensitivity analyses. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
  
2. Literature review and research focus 
 The link between bank market power and bank stability has become a lively debate 
during the last three decades following financial deregulation and crises throughout the world. 
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Marcus (1984) is the first to build a theoretical model showing that competition on the deposit 
market drives banks to undertake risk-taking strategies due to the contraction in banks‟ 
franchise value. This view is well-known as the “franchise value” hypothesis.  
 Broecker (1990) supports the “franchise value” hypothesis by finding a negative 
relationship between average banks‟ credit quality and the number of banks on the market. 
Besanko and Thakor (1993) highlight that a higher degree of bank competition is associated 
with a decrease in information rents obtained from relationship lending which in turn 
increases bank risk taking. Matutes and Vives (1996) further show that market power lowers 
bank default probability, although an imperfect competition framework with product 
differentiation is taken into account.  
 Keeley (1990) is the first to show that competition in the U.S banking industry in the 
aftermath of financial deregulation erodes bank charter value and induces banks to take on 
more risk. Demsetz et al. (1996) also analyze the U.S banking industry and find that banks 
with higher market power are the ones with higher solvency ratios and lower asset risk. In a 
single-country setting, Bofondi and Ghobi (2004) find that the increased number of banks in 
the Italian banking system worsens the default rate of loans, while Jimenez et al. (2008) shed 
light on the negative relationship between the Lerner index and risk taking for Spanish banks. 
In a cross-country setting, Levy-Yeyati and Micco (2007) find a negative impact of 
competition on bank stability in Latin American countries. 
 While the empirical literature mainly reports the impact of bank competition on 
individual bank risk taking, the decline in the franchise value of banks during liberalization 
periods as a source of banking crisis has also been reported by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), 
Taylor (1983), Cho (1986), Fry (1988), Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989), Jensen (1989) and 
Chang and Velasco (2001). Beck et al. (2006) again emphasize the effect of bank 
concentration on the probability of banking crises. From 69 countries during the 1980-1997 
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period, they find that banking crises are less likely to occur in a more concentrated banking 
system. In the case of Russian banks, Fungáčová and Weill (2009) find that a higher degree of 
bank competition is associated with an increase in bank failures. In the case of developing 
countries over the 1999-2005 period, Ariss (2010) finds that greater bank market power 
enhances bank stability and profit efficiency, although it also deteriorates cost efficiency.  
 In spite of a growing literature supporting the “franchise value” hypothesis, Boyd and 
De Nicolo (2005) propose another view known as the “competition-stability” hypothesis. 
They show that bank market power in the deposit market induces banks to increase the cost of 
borrowing for entrepreneurs. Such a strategy can increase entrepreneurial moral hazard to 
undertake risky projects which in turn increases entrepreneurial default risk. Higher 
entrepreneurial default risk therefore erodes the solvency of banks through risk-shifting 
mechanisms emphasized by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).  
 Boyd et al. (2006) provide evidence that supports the “competition-stability” 
hypothesis. For a U.S. and an international bank sample, they show that a higher degree of 
bank competition is not necessarily associated with an increase in the probability of bank 
failures. In the case of European banks, Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) further highlight that 
bank concentration deteriorates financial stability. This negative effect of bank concentration 
on stability is more severe in the less developed countries of Eastern Europe. Using a sample 
of banks located in Southeast Asia, Liu et al. (2011) show that greater bank competition does 
not necessarily increase bank risk taking.  
 In the meantime, some studies highlight the role of bank capital requirements as 
prudential tools that might affect the competition-stability nexus in banking. Using a sample 
of 543 banks operating in 13 Central and East European (CEE) countries over the 1998-2005 
period, Agoraki et al. (2009) find that capital requirements reduce risk in general, but for 
banks with higher market power this effect is significantly weaker or can be reversed. 
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Moreover, using a sample of 421 commercial banks from 61 countries, Behr et al. (2010) also 
show that, after controlling for financial development, legal system efficiency, and several 
individual bank and country-specific variables, the effectiveness of capital requirements to 
reduce bank risk taking only holds in banking markets with a lower degree of concentration. 
Such evidence reflects that a higher degree of bank concentration has already enabled banks 
to reinforce their charter value and hence, to increase banks‟ capital ratios (Berger et al., 
2009). Therefore, the reinforcement of non-binding capital requirements in well-capitalized 
banks can deteriorate bank stability due to a decrease in the monitoring intensity and the 
amount of capital held by the banks (Blum, 2003).  
 Although some papers highlight the role of prudential regulations (e.g. bank capital 
requirements) in the nexus between bank competition and risk, to our best knowledge, only 
few studies highlight how bank competition affects banks‟ discretionary behavior in their 
capital management. More specifically, Schaeck and Cihak (2010) show that banks in a more 
competitive market tend to hold higher capital ratios as “peer market discipline” tools, while 
Berger et al. (2009) find the opposite result.  
 Berger et al. (2009a) highlight that the “franchise value” hypothesis and the 
“competition-stability” hypothesis need not be opposing propositions. Based on a sample of 
8,235 banks in developed countries, their empirical results indicate that a higher degree of 
bank market power is associated with an increase in non-performing loans, supporting the 
“competition-stability” hypothesis. On the other hand, a higher degree of bank market power 
is also associated with a decrease in bank insolvency risk and hence, highlighting the 
“franchise value” hypothesis. The latter finding is due to an increase in bank capital ratios 
when bank market power increases.  
 By considering a sample of Asian banks during the 2001-2007 period, moreover, 
Soedarmono et al. (2011) show that although banks hold more capital in less competitive 
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markets, greater market power is associated with higher instability. But their results also 
highlight that higher economic growth tends to temper risk taking incentives.  
 As our study focuses on the Asian banking industry that has experienced a severe 
financial crisis at least in 1997, we extend the existing literature on the relationships between 
bank competition, capital ratios and risk by considering the influence of crises. Our work 
extends Soedarmono et al. (2011) who investigate a close issue by using a sample of banks for 
the 2001-2007 period which was not affected by financial crises. In this paper, by considering 
a longer time period (1994-2009), we focus on the risk behavior of banks during the 1997 
Asian financial crisis as well as the global crisis of 2008.  
 Previous literature on the business cycle theory suggests that during a downturn period 
due to a financial crisis, banks are likely to become more risk-averse by reducing loan 
extension and thus by building up capital ratios (Borio et al., 2001; Ayuso et al., 2004; Jokipii 
and Milne, 2008). Such a situation can reduce bank moral hazard to undertake excessive risk 
which will in turn reduce the systematic risk exposure of banks. In contrast, Cook (2009) 
points out that some countries in Asia still suffer from bank moral hazard during the 1997 
Asian crisis period. Therefore, the impact of market power on bank risk behavior remains 
questionable during a financial crisis, because crises are likely to modify the risk behavior of 
banks. They can either become more risk-averse or  follow riskier strategies (moral hazard) to 
further exploit safety net subsidies. 
 Further, we also extend the existing literature that considers bank regulation in the 
competition-stability nexus in banking. In this regard, our paper is the first to examine the role 
of too-big-to-fail subsidies on the link between bank competition and risk-taking behavior. 
Considering the influence of too-big-to-fail subsidies is an important dimension to shed light 
on the role of the lender of last resort, as we investigate the impact of financial crises.  
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 To this end, our main goal is to closely examine whether financial crises and too-big-
to-fail subsidies affect the competition-stability nexus in banking. Our study is thus useful to 
provide a benchmark for bank consolidation and too-big-to-fail policies that aim to enhance 
market power in the banking industry.  
 
3. Data, variables and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Data 
 The data used in this paper are taken from several sources. Bank-level data are 
retrieved from BankScope Fitch IBCA to construct a sample consisting of an unbalanced 
panel of annual series for the 1994–2009 period covering the 1997/1998 Asian crisis and the 
2008 credit crisis. We also impose some restrictions on our initial bank sample. Following 
Ariss (2010) we exclude banks with less than three consecutive yearly observations and banks 
that do not provide information on the main variables we use to calculate the degree of market 
power in the banking industry, such as interest expenses, loans, or net income.  
Following Agusman et al. (2006),  Laeven (1999) and Soedarmono et al. (2011) who 
study Asian banks, we focus only on commercial banks, since commercial banks tend to have 
more freedom to choose their business mix and face similar restrictions across countries. We 
therefore end up with 636 commercial banks established in 11 countries in Asia. These 
include the following countries where the number of banks obtained in each country is shown 
in parentheses: China (103), Hong Kong (68), India (84), Indonesia (108), Malaysia (63), 
Pakistan (34), Philippines (39), South Korea (50), Sri Lanka (14), Thailand (40), and Vietnam 
(33).  
Meanwhile, country-level data, such as foreign exchange reserves, real gross domestic 
product and inflation rate, come from the International Financial Statistics database (IFS) 
provided by the International Monetary Fund. Country data regarding financial structure come 
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from Beck and Demirgüc-Kunt (2009), while data on country governance (governance index) 
come from Kaufmann et al. (2008). Finally, we also retrieve the economic freedom index 
provided by Heritage Foundation. 
 
3.2 Bank competition 
 To estimate the degree of competition in the banking industry we use a measure of 
market power for the banking industry considered as a whole (aggregate index), as in 
Soedarmono et al. (2011), which is more appropriate than individual bank indices for Asian 
banking industries characterized by complex ownership structures and pyramids. Hence, we 
analyze the impact of aggregate indexes of bank market power on individual bank risk taking, 
insolvency risk and capital ratios.  Liu et al. (2011) also use a bank competition measure at the 
country level to analyze the link between bank competition and risk taking in Southeast Asia.  
 In this paper, we employ the new industrial organization approach applied to the 
banking sector as in Uchida and Tsutsui (2005). We hence use panel data techniques to 
estimate the degree of market power for each period. Such an approach does not require any 
information on the market structure of each bank and a market equilibrium assumption. 
Furthermore, this method allows us to determine the degree of market power endogenously 
and hence, differences in bank business models can be taken into account, e.g. whether banks 
mainly perform traditional intermediation activities or are more involved in non-interest 
income activities.  
More specifically, we jointly estimate a system of three equations that correspond to a 
translog cost function, to a bank profit maximization revenue function, and to an inverse loan 
demand function for each country, as shown in Equation (1). To define output, we follow 
Brissimis et al. (2008) using total revenue from both interest and non-interest revenue2. This 
                                                 
2
 We estimate the competition measure as in Soedarmono (2010) and in Soedarmono et al. (2011). Soedarmono 
(2010) investigates the link between bank competition and economic growth in the Asian context (Finance-
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construction allows us to implicitly capture the implications of a different strategy of banks, 
since they can perform both interest and non-interest income activities for bank profitability, a 
trend which has been observed in most banking systems around the world.  
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 Variables with bars are deviations from their cross-sectional means in each time period 
to reduce multicollinearity. The degree of competition in each year is given by  1,0t  
representing the well-known conjectural variations of elasticity of total banking industry 
outputs with respect to the output of bank i. In the case of perfect competition, 0t  ; under 
pure monopoly, 1t  ; and finally, 0t implies pricing below marginal cost and could 
result, for example, from a non-optimizing behavior of banks.  
 Specifically, itC  is measured by total expenses, itq  by total earning assets, itd  by total 
deposits and short-term funding, itw  by the ratio of operating expenses to total assets, itR  by 
total revenue, itr  by the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits, itp  by the ratio of total 
revenue to total earning assets. Meanwhile, tGDPG , tIR  and itTA  are factors that affect 
                                                                                                                                                         
Growth nexus). Soedarmono et al. (2011) consider the influence of economic growth on  the bank competition-
bank stability nexus by considering a shorter time period not affected by financial crises (2001-2007). 
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demand, defined as the growth of real gross domestic product (GDP), the short-term interest 
rate, and bank total assets, respectively3.  
 In the next turn, we perform country-level estimations and specify the Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) method to solve System (1). To estimate t  we use annual time 
dummy variables, while to estimate   we use bi-annual time dummy variables (every two 
years). This is because the values taken by   are linearly dependent on the time-specific 
control variable (GDPG and IR) in the third structural equation of System (1). In the 
subsequent analyses, t  denotes the Lerner index (LERNER) of the banking industry in each 
country.  
 In some cases, moreover, we also consider the square term 2LERNER  to capture 
possible non-linearity effects of market power on capital ratios, risk taking and insolvency 
risk. In calculating 2LERNER , we set 2LERNER  equal to zero if the value taken by LERNER 
is negative. 
 
3.3. Dependent and control variables 
In this study, we consider three dependent variables of interest to assess bank stability. 
These include the ratio of bank capital, a risk taking proxy and an insolvency risk measure. 
The ratio of bank capital is measured either by the total risk-based capital ratio (CAR) or the 
ratio of total equity to total assets (EQTA). To measure bank risk taking, we use the standard 
deviation of profitability measured either by the return on assets (or SDROA) or the return on 
equity (or SDROE)4. Following  Agoraki et al. (2009), SDROA and SDROE at time t are both 
calculated on the basis of observations of ROA and ROE, respectively, from time t to t – 2  (a 
                                                 
3
 Following Brissimis et al. (2008), the short-term interest rate can be the interbank rate, the money market rate, 
etc, depending on data availability in each country. As we estimate the degree of bank competition separately for 
each country, this procedure is not a potential problem as highlighted by Brissimis et al. (2008).  
4
 Return on assets (ROA) is the ratio of net income to total assets, while return on equity (ROE) is the ratio of net 
income to total equity. 
 15 
three period-based rolling window). In order to measure bank insolvency risk, moreover, we 
use two types of Z-score measures based on either ROA or ROE represented by ZROA or 
ZROE, respectively.  
ZROA indicates the number of standard deviations that a bank‟s ROA has to drop 
below its expected value before equity is depleted. Thus, a higher ZROA is associated with a 
decrease in a bank‟s default probability or bank‟s insolvency risk. For each bank i and time t, 
ZROA is defined as follows 
 
, ,
,
,
i t i t
i t
i t
ROA EQTA
ZROA
SDROA
  
SDROA is calculated on the basis of a three-period rolling window as described above. 
Likewise, we also consider the Z-score based on the return on average equity (ZROE) to 
capture bank insolvency risk. ZROE is defined as follows 
,
,
,
1 i t
i t
i t
ROE
ZROE
SDROE
  
SDROE is also calculated on the basis of a three-period rolling window.  
 Finally, we also introduce a set of control variables that are bank specific and country 
specific. For bank-specific control variables, we consider the ratio of total deposits and short-
term funding to total assets (DEPO), the ratio of total loans to total assets (LOAN), the ratio of 
loan loss provisions to total loans (LLP), the ratio of operating expenses to total assets 
(OVERHEAD) and the logarithm of bank total assets (SIZE). For country-specific control 
variables, we incorporate the annual growth rate of foreign exchange reserve (FOREXG), the 
real gross domestic product growth rate (GDPG) and the inflation rate (INF).  
 For an additional analysis, we also include the ratio of the three largest banks‟ total 
assets to GDP (TBTS) in some regressions to highlight the influence of too-big-to-fail policies 
at the country level that might affect bank risk taking behavior. Accordingly, we further 
incorporate the interaction term between LERNER and TBTS (or LERNER*TBTS) to examine 
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the combined effect of market power in banking and too-big-to-fail subsidies provided by the 
lender of last resort.  
 
3.5. Descriptive statistics 
 In order to eliminate the effects of measurement errors, we eliminate the extreme 
bank/year values of some variables that exhibit left-skewed and/or right-skewed distributions 
before we run the regressions. Specifically, we eliminate the 2.5% highest and/or 2.5% lowest 
values  of our variables that are left-skewed and/or right-skewed. Such a method which is 
standard in the literature has an important drawback because it systematically eliminates 
values that could be of interest, particularly during crisis periods. We therefore carefully 
check that we only eliminate obvious outliers due to errors in data collection. Furthermore, we 
only clean some of our variables by using such a procedure: ROE, ZROA, ZROE and 
OVERHEAD. For ROE, we eliminate both their 2.5% lowest and 2.5% highest values, 
because ROE values initially range from – 301 to 1543 which are not economically plausible 
values given that ROE is the ratio of net income to total equity5. For ZROA, ZROE and 
OVERHEAD, we only eliminate their 2.5% highest values because these variables only 
exhibit a right-skewed distribution6. In addition, regarding DEPO and LLP, we do not impose 
the similar restrictions applied to ROE, ZROA, ZROE and OVERHEAD. Specifically, we 
eliminate DEPO and LLP values that are higher than 1 and lower than 0, since both variables 
should range from 0 to 1.  
 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the “clean” variables used in this paper, while 
Table 2 shows the degree of market power in the banking industry for each country and at 
                                                 
5
 To ensure robustness, we also consider a different cut-off in cleaning ROE where we eliminate their 1% highest 
and 1% lowest values. The empirical results remain unaltered.   
6
 Again, we also consider a cut-off of 1% in performing this procedure. The empirical results are also consistent 
with the case when we use a cut-off of 2.5%.  
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each time period. Moreover, Table 3 presents the correlation among all the variables used in 
this study7. 
 In Table 1, we also present three indicators (ECOFREE, RLAW and STOCK) used as 
instrumental variables for LERNER discussed in the next section. We retrieve the economic 
freedom index (ECOFREE) from Heritage Foundation, the rule of law index (RLAW) from 
Kaufman et al. (2008) and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (STOCK) from 
Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009).  
 
Insert Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 here 
 
4. Econometric specification and methodology 
 Our analysis departs from Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) who investigate the link 
between consolidation and stability in European banking. However, in this paper, we consider 
the link with market power instead of concentration as in Udhe and Heimeshoff (2009) in 
order to account for the implications of bank consolidation. This is because bank 
consolidations are likely to enhance market power and improve efficiency rather than 
increasing market concentration per se (DeYoung et al., 2009). Kane (2000) also finds that 
acquiring stockholders in US bank „megamergers‟ experienced positive abnormal returns, 
highlighting that consolidation opens access to greater market power that increases 
profitability. De Guevara et al. (2005) again document that consolidations drove down 
European banks‟ marginal costs faster than output prices, suggesting an increase in European 
banks‟ market power after consolidation.  
 For the sake of consistency with prior literature on the competition-stability nexus in 
banking (e.g. Schaeck and Cihak, 2010; Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009), moreover, we employ 
                                                 
7
 Performing a variation inflation factor (VIF) test confirms that that multicollinearity is not a major issue 
(coefficient lower than 10). The VIF test is reported in tables presenting estimation results (from Table 4 to 10). 
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the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) with fixed effect corrections. By taking into account 
individual and time fixed effects, we avoid drawbacks due to omitted variables that are bank 
specific and time specific. In specifying the 2SLS estimations, we incorporate three 
instrumental variables for LERNER. These variables include the economic freedom index 
(ECOFREE), the rule of law index (RLAW) and the ratio of stock market capitalization to 
GDP (STOCK)8. 
 In this study, we also consider whether financial crises affect the impact of market 
power in the banking industry on bank capital ratios, risk taking and insolvency risk. The 
financial crises taken into account in this study are the 1997 Asian crisis and the 2008 credit 
crisis. For such a purpose, we consider the 1997-1999 period that stands for the Asian crisis 
period; and the 2007-2009 period to capture the 2008 credit crisis period. Cook (2009) has 
emphasized the 1997-1999 period to shed light on the Asian financial crisis. In the meantime, 
considering the 2007-2009 period to highlight the 2008 crisis is consistent with higher 
volatility in the spread between the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the 
Overnight Indexed Swaps rate (OIS) which is considered as a measure of the soundness of the 
banking system9.  
  In terms of methodology, we proceed in four steps. First, we analyze the impact of 
market power in the banking industry on bank capital ratios, risk taking and insolvency risk 
for the whole period of study from 1994 to 2009. Second, we repeat the first step, but we only 
consider the 1997-1999 period to account for the influence of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
Third, we also repeat the first step, but the estimations are only conducted for the 2007-2009 
period to capture the influence of the 2008 credit crisis. Finally, we again repeat these three 
                                                 
8
 See Appendix B for further explanation with regards to the use of economic freedom, rule of law and stock 
market capitalization as instrumental variables for LERNER. 
9
 On August 2007, the LIBOR-OIS spread was around 10 basis points, while on September 2007, the spread rose 
significantly to 85 basis points that marked the beginning of a crisis period. As of October 10, 2008, the spread 
rose again to 365 basis points and reached a peak on December 2008, before gradually decreasing in 2009. By 
the end of 2009, credit risks remain higher than those in August 2007 and hence, 2009 is still considered as part 
of the 2008 crisis period. See Sengupta and Tam (2008) or Gefang et al. (2011) for further details. 
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steps by incorporating the interaction term between market power in banking and too-big-to-
fail subsidies (LERNER*TBTS) as an explanatory variable to examine whether too-big-to-fail 
policies at the country level might affect the relation between market power and stability in 
banking. 
 
5. Empirical results    
 We run all our regressions by specifying instrumental variables for market power 
(LERNER). Table 4 shows that our instrumental variables (ECOFREE, RLAW and STOCK) 
are significantly linked to the banking industry market power variable (LERNER). Higher 
bank competition could be driven by better rules of law, a result which is consistent with the 
view that shareholder protection improves financial globalization which in turn may increase 
the degree of competition among banks (Moshirian, 2009). On the contrary, we denote that 
economic freedom (ECOFREE) and stock market capitalization (STOCK) do not necessarily 
hinder the degree of market power in the banking industry. Specifically, both ECOFREE and 
STOCK positively affect the degree of market power in the banking industry.  
Insert Table 4 here 
 
5.1. Overall period 
  Table 5 shows the results obtained with 2SLS estimations for the overall period from 
1994 to 2009. Regarding bank capitalization as measured by CAR and EQTA, our results 
indicate a positive impact of market power in banking (LERNER) on bank capital ratios. 
Although we incorporate the squared term of the market power index (LERNER_SQ), the 
positive link between LERNER and bank capital ratios (CAR and EQTA) is not altered, albeit 
not significant. These results are consistent with Berger el al. (2009a) who find a positive 
relationship between bank-level Lerner indexes and the capital ratio.  
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Insert Table 5 here 
 
  Considering the link between bank competition and risk taking, we find that market 
power (LERNER) is positively related to banks‟ income volatility measures (SDROA and 
SDROE), while this relationship remains unaltered when we incorporate LERNER_SQ as a 
control variable. Such relationships thus indicate that market power in the banking industry 
increases bank risk taking10.   
   With regards to the impact of bank competition on bank insolvency risk, Table 5 shows 
that higher market power (LERNER) leads to higher bank insolvency risk as measured by 
ZROA and ZROE. Meanwhile, LERNER_SQ is positively related to ZROE with an inflection 
point of 0.95. However, we observe that more than 99% of the observations are below 0.95. 
Thus higher market power (LERNER) leads to higher bank insolvency risk (ZROA and 
ZROE)11.  
 On the whole, considering the results shown in Table 5, our findings indicate that in 
less competitive banking markets, although higher capital ratios are expected to lower bank 
default risk, higher risk taking drives default risk in the opposite direction. Therefore, our 
results suggest that the increase in capital ratios in less competitive banking markets is not 
high enough to offset higher bank risk taking and to guarantee bank solvency. Our results also 
suggest that the self-disciplining factor induced by higher market power is not sufficient to 
moderate excessive bank risk taking, and to increase bank incentives to hold sufficient capital 
to ensure bank solvency.  
                                                 
10
 To check for robustness, we also calculate respectively SDROA and SDROE on the basis of ROA and ROE, 
from time t and time t – 1 (a two period-based rolling window). The estimation results are not altered, and the 
outputs for these specifications are available from the authors upon request.  
11
 To check for robustness, we further employ ZROA based on SDROA which is calculated using observations of  
ROA at time t and time t – 1 (a two period-based rolling window). The link between LERNER and ZROA is not 
altered. Analogically, we also compute ZROE on the basis of two-period rolling windows to define the standard 
deviation. The link between LERNER and ZROE is not altered.  
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Our findings are in line with those of Agusman et al. (2006), where greater charter 
value in Asian listed banks fails to reduce banks‟ income volatility. Our findings are also 
consistent with Liu et al. (2011), where higher bank competition results in higher stability in 
Southeast Asian banks. Our findings also support Schaeck et al. (2009) who analyze the 
competition-stability nexus using the Panzar-Rosse approach. Using a sample of both 
developed and developing countries, including some of the Asian countries used in our study, 
they show that a more competitive banking market is less prone to a systemic banking crisis 
and exhibit increased time to crisis.  
Conversely, our findings differ from Ariss (2010) who studies developing countries in 
a cross-country setting, where greater bank market power is found to enhance bank stability. 
Such differences could be explained by the fact that we use a sample of different countries in 
our study, or that we focus on a panel data approach that considers time fixed effects. The 
importance of time-fixed effects in the nexus between bank competition and financial stability 
is shown in the next section, in which we analyze whether financial crises affect such 
relationships and hence, can alter our previous findings.  
 
5.2. Do financial crises matter? 
 During a financial crisis that creates an economic downturn, it is perceived that banks 
tend to reduce loans and build up capital ratios, since capital is expected to buffer against the 
shocks of the crisis and to increase banks‟ competitive advantage in a market (Berger and 
Bouwman, 2009). Higher risk aversion of banks can thus moderate moral hazard in terms of 
excessive lending. Conversely, Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick (1999) point out that during a 
crisis, banks could behave imprudently due to a massive decline in bank capital ratios and an 
increase in maturity mismatch. This is because such situations erode the franchise value of 
banks encouraging risky or fraudulent behavior. 
 22 
 As bank franchise values become important during crisis periods, we analyze whether 
during financial crises, higher market power in the banking industry that facilitates banks to 
maintain their franchise value is important to moderate bank moral hazard. The financial 
crises analyzed in this study include the 1997/1998 Asian crisis and the 2008 credit crisis.  
In order to investigate the competition-stability nexus in banking during the 1997 
Asian crisis, we repeat the estimations conducted in Section 5.1 for the 1997-1999 period. 
From Table 6, it appears that higher LERNER reduces bank capital ratios as measured by 
EQTA and CAR. Meanwhile, during the 1997 Asian crisis, higher LERNER has no longer a 
destabilizing impact, even though bank capital ratios become lower. Specifically, higher 
market power in banking has a negative impact on risk taking (SDROA and SDROE) and a 
positive impact on bank solvency  (ZROA and ZROE). 
 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
Such findings could be due to the fact that, during a financial crisis that has directly 
affected Asian banks, the degree of banks' risk aversion is higher.  Hence banks might be 
shrinking their lending activities and their exposure to systematic risk might be lower. Also, 
during a financial crisis, banks could experience a massive decline in their capital ratios that 
in turn could exacerbate capital crunch problems (Bernanke and Lown, 1991). In this context, 
bank moral hazard in terms of imprudent lending decisions is presumably less likely to 
operate.   
Moreover, the increasing role of foreign ownership, foreign banks or foreign direct 
investments in the Asian banking industry during the 1997 Asian crisis, as documented by 
Williams and Nguyen (2005), Moshirian (2008) or Jeon et al. (2011), could also explain a 
stabilizing impact of LERNER during a crisis period. In their theoretical model, Althammer 
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and Haselmann (2011) show that during crisis periods in emerging markets, foreign banks 
from industrialized countries tend to enter emerging markets because of the loss of 
comparative advantage that domestic banks endure in unstable credit market conditions. In 
times of crisis, it is perceived that hard information on borrowers‟ profile is relatively more 
important than soft information. Hence, a better screening technology to value borrowers 
based on hard information enables foreign banks to increase their market share in emerging 
markets. In this regard, higher degree of market power in emerging markets‟ banking sectors 
during a financial crisis could be influenced by an increase in foreign banks‟ market share 
which in turn could have a stabilizing impact. Hence, in some sense, our findings also provide 
empirical support for Althammer and Haselmann (2011). 
Further, we again repeat the estimations conducted in Section 5.1 for the 2007-2009 
period to analyze whether the impact of market power in the banking industry on bank capital 
ratios, risk taking, and insolvency risk has changed during the 2008 global credit crisis. Table 
7 presents our empirical results for the 2007-2009 period. During the 2008 crisis, LERNER is 
significantly and positively associated with bank capital ratios (EQTA or CAR). Higher 
LERNER is also positively related to bank risk-taking (SDROE) and insolvency risk (ZROE), 
but only at the 10% level. Hence, according to our results the 2008 crisis has not affected the 
risk-taking behavior of Asian banks in general as much as the 1997 crisis. As a whole, banks 
in less competitive markets still exhibit higher insolvency risks during the 2008 crisis period. 
This finding can be explained by the fact that the 2008 crisis did not directly affect Asian 
banks (Standard and Poor, 2008).  As such, the risk-taking behavior of banks from 1994 to 
2009 has not significantly changed during the 2008 crisis.  
 
Insert Table 7 here 
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5.3. Additional analysis: The role of too-big-to-fail subsidies 
 In this section, we focus on moral hazard issues that could operate in Asian banks. 
Cook (2009) points out that during the 1997 Asian crisis, some countries in Asia had suffered 
from bank moral hazard in the form of “gambling for resurrection” and “looting”12. Since our 
results in Section 5.2 show that market power in banking has a stabilizing impact in all Asian 
countries during the 1997 Asian crisis, we now extend the analysis by examining whether or 
not the competition-stability links are country-specific.  
 For this purpose, the country-specific factor we use to assess moral hazard issues is the 
extent to which the banking sector might benefit from too-big-to-fail subsidies, since it is 
well-known that bailout policies could exacerbate moral hazard in banking. Specifically, we 
consider another additional explanatory variable, TBTS, measured as the ratio of three largest 
banks‟ total assets to GDP and calculated from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009). Higher 
TBTS reflects that the banking system is “too big to save” and hence, central banks need to 
engage in higher bailout subsidies, at least for the largest banks. To better assess the role of 
market power in banking, moreover, we also incorporate the interaction term between market 
power in banking and the too-big-to-save effects (LERNER*TBTS)13. Table 8, Table 9 and 
Table 10 present our results for the overall period, the 1997-1999 period and the 2007-2009 
period, respectively.  
 In Table 8, we report that higher LERNER leads to higher capital ratios, risk taking and 
insolvency risk of banks for the 1994-2009 period. In contrast, these results are reversed when 
we consider LERNER*TBTS, while the absolute values of the coefficients of LERNER*TBTS 
are higher than those of LERNER. Hence moral hazard behavior that encourages banks to 
                                                 
12
 Gambling for resurrection is a strategy of distressed banks to maintain profitability by excessively increasing 
loans to high-risk but high-return borrowers. Meanwhile, distressed banks also tend to increase deposit rates in 
order to attract more deposits to fund these loans. Looting is a strategy of distressed banks to extend loans at 
“below-market”  rates to related corporations (La Porta et al, 2001). 
13
 Since LERNER is treated as endogenous variable, we also treat LERNER*TBTS as endogenous variable. The 
similar approach is also used by Schaeck and Cihak (2010) in assessing the joint impact of bank competition and 
economic development on bank capital ratios. 
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increase risk in less competitive markets only occur in countries with lower too-big-to-fail 
potential subsidies.  
 
Insert Table 8 here 
 
 Our results are somehow consistent with Acharya et al (2012), although they analyze 
the joint role of the lender of last resort and market power in interbank markets in overcoming 
bank liquidity risk. In their model, banks in less competitive interbank markets are more likely 
to face higher cost of interbank lending. In this regard, the role of central banks to provide 
liquidity, particularly during crisis periods, is essential to improve the private allocation of 
liquidity among banks.  
 The role of the lender of last resort is indeed relatively more important during crisis 
periods than normal periods. In the Asian crisis period, Table 9 presents how the interaction 
term between market power and too-big-to-fail subsidies in banking (LERNER*TBTS) affects 
bank risk taking for the 1997-1999 period. Our findings show that the negative impact of 
market power in banking on bank income volatility and insolvency risk, despite lower capital 
ratios, only holds in countries with lower too-big-to-fail subsidies. This indicates that the 
stabilizing impact of higher market power in banking during the 1997 Asian crisis only holds 
for countries with lower too-big-to-fail subsidies. In this regard, bank consolidation policies 
aiming to enhance market power in the banking industry might not be effective in enhancing 
bank stability, unless the role of lender of last resort in providing too-big-to-fail subsidies is 
limited.   
 
Insert Table 9 here 
 
 26 
 Our results for the 1997-1999 period are consistent with Cook (2009) who states that 
during the Asian crisis, some Asian countries had suffered from severe bank moral hazard 
behavior. We provide further explanation for Cook (2009) that such countries are the ones 
with the highest too-big-to-fail potential subsidies. Therefore in the presence of higher too-
big-to-fail subsidies because of the presence of significantly large banks, bank consolidations 
that aim to enhance market power in banking are likely to be ineffective to limit the risk-
taking behavior of banks during crisis periods. 
 Finally, Table 10 presents the joint impact of market power and too-big-to-fail 
subsidies in banking on the risk behavior of banks for the 2007-2009 period. The results over 
this period are similar to the ones for the 1994-2009 period.  In countries with lower too-big-
to-fail subsidies, higher market power in banking seems to have a destabilizing impact.  
 
Insert Table 10 here 
 
6. Sensitivity analyses 
 In order to ensure the robustness of our results, we perform several sensitivity 
analyses. For brevity, the results of these sensitivity analyzes are not reported in the paper but 
are available from the authors on request. 
 First, we re-estimate all the regressions presented in Section 5 by using the 
Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) instead of the 2SLS method. Within this 
framework we also treat LERNER and LERNER*TBTS as endogenous variables instrumented 
by ECOFREE, RLAW and STOCK. Our overall findings remain the same.   
 Second, differences in macroeconomic and financial environments such as degree of 
development and financial structure, as well as institutional factors that affect economic and 
political characteristics, may explain bank risk exposures. To account for this dimension, we 
 27 
incorporate country-specific dummy variables as explanatory variables in (2) 14. Indonesia is 
treated as the numeraire country. As country-specific dummies are time-invariant variables, 
individual fixed effects corrections are thus no longer applicable. By specifying the 2SLS 
estimation with time fixed-effect corrections, our main empirical findings discussed in Section 
5 are not altered.  
Third, the trends in financial globalization in Asia might change the nature of banking 
products from traditional activities (deposits funded loans) to non-interest income generating 
activities. Therefore, bank non-interest income may also explain some of the risk exposure of 
banks. We thus incorporate the ratio of non-interest income to total revenue (NNI) as an 
explanatory variable in (2). Moreover, we also take into account the annual loan growth rate 
(LOANG) as one of the control variables that affect bank capitalization (Ayuso et al., 2004). 
Using this new specification, our main findings remain consistent, even though we lose a 
substantial number of observations.  
Fourth, we modify the degree of market power in the banking industry by considering 
alternative specifications of the inverse demand function, as shown in (1). We use OPL (the 
ratio of operating expenses to total loans) instead of TA in the demand function, as bank 
monitoring costs can affect the pricing of bank loans. We also include the inflation rate (INF) 
to replace the short-term interest rate (IR). This alternative specification does not alter our 
main findings obtained in Section 5.  
 
7. Summary and concluding remarks 
 In spite of a strong consolidation in Asian banking, there is no evidence that such a 
process enhances bank stability. This paper attempts to assess such an issue by investigating 
the impact of market power in banking on bank capital ratios, risk taking, and insolvency risk. 
                                                 
14
 Agusman et al. (2008) also use the similar approach to account for unobservable country-specific 
characteristics in the Asian context.  
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Based on a sample of 636 commercial banks in 11 Asian countries over the 1994-2009 period, 
our empirical results highlight that a higher degree of market power in banking is associated 
with an increase in bank risk taking and bank insolvency risk although capital ratios are also 
higher. However, these findings do not hold during the 1997 Asian crisis period (1997-1999), 
where higher market power decreases bank risk taking and insolvency risk.  These results are 
robust to several sensitivity analyses. 
Specifically, our findings show that in general, the increase in capital ratios in less 
competitive environments is not high enough to offset the effect of higher risk taking on bank 
insolvency risk, highlighting possible moral hazard problems in Asian banks. During a 
financial crisis, our results for the 1997-1999 period show that lower competition has a 
stabilizing effect which is opposite to what we find in the overall period of study and in the 
2007-2009 period. Under such circumstances, higher market power in the banking industry 
might contribute to reduce moral hazard, at least in the crisis period that has directly affected 
Asian banking. 
A closer investigation is also conducted to examine whether or not such results are 
country specific. Indeed some Asian countries  suffered from relatively more severe bank 
moral hazard problems in the form of “gambling for resurrection” or “looting”, particularly 
during the 1997 Asian crisis period. As such, the length of the crisis and the degree of 
economic recovery differed from one country to another. By incorporating the role of too-big-
to-fail subsidies as a country-specific factors, our results are reversed for countries with larger 
banks which could force central banks to engage in higher amounts of too-big-to-fail 
subsidies. 
 These findings have various policy implications with regards to bank consolidation 
policies and the role of the lender of last resort. In the Asian context, market power in the 
banking industry, which is expected to enhance self-discipline induced by lower competition, 
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does generally neither moderate bank risk taking nor provide enough incentives for banks to 
hold sufficiently more capital to prevent higher insolvency risk, except when the behavior of 
the lender of resort in providing too-big-to-fail subsidies is more stringent to limit bank moral 
hazard incentives. Specifically, our results indicate that during financial crises that directly 
affect Asian banks, the stabilizing effect of market power is only effective for countries with 
smaller large banks i.e. when the role of  lender of resort is more limited. On the whole in 
achieving bank stability public authorities need to consider the degree of competitiveness of 
the banking system but also the size of the largest so-called systemic banks.  
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Appendix A. Descriptive statistics, the degree of bank competition and the correlation structure 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
 
    Overall period 1997-1999 2007-2009 
 Variables Definition  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
           
Q Total earning assets (million USD)  12222.52  1348.853  60736.07  5929.383  844.8070  25203.56  30771.10  3985.785  118645.9 
C Total expenses (million USD)  87535.96  297.1870  547422.7  103961.1  310.2390  622289.3  1260.945  231.3815  3882.355 
D Total deposits and short term funding (million USD)  10349.27  1133.506  56588.01  5271.261  684.3860  24055.55  25421.58  3230.881  111212.5 
R Total revenue (million USD)  72277.64  159.0305  498259.1  88956.24  156.2255  576800.6  1300.721  155.6240  4765.787 
W Ratio of total operating expenses to total assets   0.024736  0.019872  0.025543  0.028478  0.021725  0.039752  0.021465  0.016132  0.016517 
r Ratio of interest expenses to total deposits  10.17837  0.081984  21.32785  10.06263  0.096854  22.75490  0.167836  0.054747  2.648107 
P Ratio of total revenue to total earning assets  13.89216  0.108187  33.43061  20.92129  0.121982  49.65530  0.093718  0.074650  0.312308 
IR Annual short-term interest rate  0.079811  0.060000  0.076506  0.130744  0.076100  0.138827  0.057196  0.045150  0.050944 
CAR Total risk-based capital ratio  0.171273  0.135000  0.117333  0.174135  0.134800  0.125041  0.165533  0.138400  0.096281 
ROA Ratio of net income to total assets   0.006952  0.009185  0.042385 -0.008159  0.006512  0.085721  0.009173  0.009563  0.012600 
EQTA Ratio of total equity to total asset  0.115373  0.082281  0.116448  0.118956  0.083999  0.126046  0.109291  0.084159  0.083401 
SDROA Standard deviation of ROA from a three-period rolling window  0.011810  0.003223  0.038869  0.020430  0.004544  0.057511  0.004382  0.002542  0.006085 
ZROA Z-score based on ROA from a three-period rolling window  46.38470  27.54334  55.55249  35.51505  18.50050  49.61298  54.59037  34.61422  58.01816 
ROE Ratio of net income to total equity  0.105095  0.112044  0.110433  0.069151  0.085259  0.142713  0.111831  0.118142  0.091134 
SDROE Standard deviation of ROE from a three-period rolling window  0.051170  0.031049  0.062242  0.066636  0.041072  0.075671  0.038990  0.027433  0.040473 
ZROE Z-score based on ROE from a three-period rolling window  55.66345  34.75530  63.18721  48.06956  26.30093  63.01023  59.46329  39.10669  60.98926 
DEPO Ratio of total deposits and short-term funding to total assets  0.717629  0.777788  0.194707  0.738272  0.800764  0.191476  0.679291  0.738749  0.188114 
LLP Ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans  0.020282  0.008244  0.054388  0.046532  0.016244  0.099020  0.012249  0.007053  0.020285 
LOAN Ratio of loans to total assets  0.528797  0.540063  0.181783  0.526862  0.532720  0.194523  0.543911  0.565570  0.147986 
SIZE Logarithm of total assets  7.329382  7.330009  2.018536  6.899275  6.848789  1.907663  8.439116  8.387506  1.917025 
FOREXG Annual growth rate of foreign exchange reserves  0.209472  0.164791  0.298904  0.189931  0.171579  0.355178  0.186091  0.227672  0.242259 
GDPG Annual growth rate of GDP   0.054326  0.058490  0.034589  0.058407  0.059400  0.017867  0.072536  0.075570  0.025387 
INF Annual inflation rate   0.059840  0.046370  0.060620  0.036183  0.031020  0.034491  0.091477  0.083790  0.077255 
RLAW Rule of law index  0.606502  0.558000  0.122908  0.619652  0.620000  0.120793  0.603925  0.544000  0.114069 
ECOFREE Economic Freedom index   0.069219 -0.001098  0.637029  0.083394  0.030354  0.569494  0.034358 -0.133680  0.713358 
STOCK Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP  0.874326  0.364420  1.146663  0.650178  0.281605  0.790303  1.624380  1.184202  1.705325 
TBTS Ratio of three largest banks' total assets to GDP  0.379762  0.253653  0.282787  0.361802  0.244049  0.236228  0.413357  0.255648  0.305100 
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Table 2. The Lerner index in the Asian banking industry. The Lerner index is calculated from the new industrial organization approach following Uhida and Tsutsui 
(2005). A higher (lower) Lerner index is associated with an increase (decrease) in market power in banking.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The Indian banking industry exhibits a negative market power throughout the sample period, which might reveal a non-optimizing behavior of banks. Dash and 
Cristabel (2009) support our findings since Indian banks experienced a sharp increase in their cost-to-income ratio during the 2003-2008 period while profitability has 
declined. Shanmugam and Das (2004) report that financial reforms during the 1992-1999 period  have not helped banks to raise their interest margins. Das et al. (2004) also 
find that Indian banks were not much differentiated in terms of input or output technical efficiency, as well as cost efficiency. Such a non-optimizing behavior of Indian banks 
might be due to the fact that the Indian banking industry is still dominated by the public sector. In the meantime, we observe that almost all the countries in our sample, except 
Malaysia and Thailand, exhibit a negative value for the market power index during the periods following the 1997/1998 Asian crisis, suggesting that banks lose their market 
power during a downturn period which in turn impedes them to maintain profitability. Among these countries, many have experienced three distinct periods based on market 
power estimates with first a positive value until the 1997/1998 crisis followed by a negative value until 2004 which became again positive afterwards (Indonesia, South Korea, 
Philippines, Vietnam and to a lesser extent Pakistan).  
 
 
 
 
                     
 Year China 
Hong- 
Kong Indonesia India South Korea Sri Lanka Malaysia Philippines Pakistan Thailand Vietnam 
1994 -0.282952 0.076967 0.346579 -0.961778 0.13124 0.175771 0.993463 0.13994 0.071763 0.665669 0.27045 
1995 -0.245039 -0.061084 0.234224 -0.865748 0.11629 0.116581 0.991431 0.133945 0.065709 0.60233 0.201964 
1996 -0.245702 -0.009032 0.204867 -0.795948 0.099509 0.12634 0.963911 0.16828 -0.067709 0.598937 0.158095 
1997 -0.260196 -0.053753 0.539131 -0.764381 0.144564 0.06195 0.932716 0.075777 -0.000681 0.548435 0.120352 
1998 -0.032251 -0.235858 1.929107 -0.659159 0.018185 0.044018 0.90165 -0.073066 0.029227 0.362615 0.160778 
1999 -0.316486 -0.674633 -0.16463 -0.986989 -0.349258 -0.506732 0.666228 -0.589532 -0.292432 0.279809 -0.144492 
2000 -0.31412 -0.674264 -0.161723 -0.981867 -0.349958 -0.50754 0.66644 -0.589708 -0.294237 0.280852 -0.144491 
2001 -0.319157 -0.673588 -0.161321 -0.982514 -0.347797 -0.507557 0.666529 -0.589205 -0.292336 0.280939 -0.144732 
2002 0.238017 -0.670538 -0.161139 -0.981794 -0.346779 -0.507313 0.666583 -0.588759 -0.294709 0.280985 -0.144813 
2003 0.300196 -0.66807 -0.160795 -0.981951 -0.344848 -0.506933 0.666762 -0.588055 -0.293095 0.281521 -0.144163 
2004 0.360446 -0.668376 -0.160011 -0.982079 -0.344368 -0.506881 0.666432 -0.58868 -0.291035 0.282955 -0.14416 
2005 0.34348 0.343875 0.367294 -0.359394 0.45999 0.116659 0.737229 0.192296 0.58054 1.000406 0.341684 
2006 0.305246 0.200099 0.385675 -0.381871 0.410134 0.118395 0.723376 0.165057 0.496203 0.883843 0.285954 
2007 0.338882 0.258267 0.488008 -0.362753 0.368536 -0.018932 0.733192 0.250056 0.416676 0.916002 0.340667 
2008 0.310007 0.32556 0.511161 -0.384193 0.245958 -0.049368 0.885034 0.169463 0.326171 0.971731 0.217162 
2009 0.384511 0.538758 0.524386 -0.31296 0.237408 -0.060188 0.957936 0.252745 0.283754 1.101859 0.398163 
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Table 3. The correlation structure of dependent, explanatory and control variables. Dependent variables include CAR, EQTA, SDROA, SDROE, ZROA and ZROE. The 
explanatory variable of interest is LERNER. The rest of variables is control variable. Definition of variables follows Table 1.  
 
  CAR EQTA SDROA SDROE ZROA ZROE LERNER SIZE 
CAR  1.000000        
EQTA  0.770018  1.000000       
SDROA  0.068970  0.160137  1.000000      
SDROE -0.087909 -0.056640  0.265024  1.000000     
ZROA  0.075189  0.100007 -0.203657 -0.398116  1.000000    
ZROE  0.101911  0.067433 -0.127882 -0.459557  0.542023  1.000000   
LERNER  0.023037  0.022878  0.045438 -0.057704  0.023418  0.043789  1.000000  
SIZE -0.397554 -0.463093 -0.125038 -0.033393  0.008266  0.027363  0.062904  1.000000 
DEPO -0.337476 -0.545758 -0.064168  0.044573 -0.072043 -0.061663 -0.088649  0.182494 
LOAN -0.235560 -0.144144 -0.054970 -0.061611  0.035775  0.031639  0.188751  0.078577 
OVERHEAD  0.103081  0.306540  0.193920  0.119858 -0.078372 -0.054521 -0.080755 -0.276017 
LLP  0.092804  0.113822  0.546070  0.158460 -0.145827 -0.078147  0.154644 -0.127020 
GDPG -0.125749 -0.041918 -0.137612 -0.120861  0.101773  0.045582  0.218359  0.112825 
INF  0.014668  0.029599  0.011313 -0.108558  0.069486  0.042301 0.251373 -0.032553 
FOREXG -0.112576 -0.059084 -0.021614  0.030050  0.012374 -0.017616 -0.09767  0.048141 
TBTS  0.234270  0.182575  0.033447  0.024409 -0.010591 -0.002304 0.159643  0.015375 
 
 
  DEPO LOAN OVERHEAD LLP GDPG INF FOREXG SYSTEMIC 
DEPO  1.000000        
LOAN  0.043025  1.000000       
OVERHEAD -0.115534 -0.064882 1      
LLP -0.046934 -0.157791 0.135287 1     
GDPG -0.079425  0.105753 -0.12318 -0.083954 1    
INF -0.141516  0.071532 0.020637 -0.018781 0.040905 1   
FOREXG 0.037863 -0.079299 -0.016459 0.030978 0.063273 0.00081 1  
TBTS -0.089433  0.010285 -0.068653 -0.008473 -0.141641 -0.204373 -0.150707 1 
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Appendix B. Instrumental variables for LERNER 
 The recent empirical literature sheds light on the endogeneity issue in the nexus 
between market power and bank risk taking (Berger et al., 2009; Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009; 
Gonzales, 2005; Schaeck and Cihak, 2010). Indeed, bank competition can be affected by a 
number of bank-specific and macroeconomic factors that are not entirely captured in the 
competition measure. Reverse causality is also problem since bank risk and capital ratios can 
also affect bank competition. To deal with endogeneity that can arise from the competition-
stability nexus, we specify instrumental variables for LERNER.   
Claessens and Laeven (2004) argue that the quality of institutions that protects 
shareholders‟ rights is an important aspect for a well-functioning financial system. We thus 
consider RLAW as one of the instrumental variables which may affect the degree of banking 
industry market power. Moshirian (2009) accentuates that the quality of the macro governance 
environment related to shareholders‟ protections will enhance the degree of financial 
globalization. If this is the case, higher RLAW can reduce bank market power as the 
competition level of the financial system due to financial globalization increases.  
Meanwhile, as discussed by Schaeck and Cihak (2010), a well developed financial 
market can change the competitive environment in which banks operate. By choosing STOCK 
as an instrumental variable, we aim to capture the effect of financial market development15. 
For instance, if the stock market is well developed, an increase in STOCK might imply that 
banks can choose to invest their funds on the stock market instead of providing loans to the 
private sector. Also, firms can have easier access to the market imposing more competitive 
pricing for bank loans. Finally, we also consider Economic Freedom (ECOFREE) as one of 
the instrumental variables for LERNER instead of the Banking Freedom indicator used by 
Berger et al. (2009), since the Economic Freedom index consists of a broader set of economic 
                                                 
15
 We have also used the ratio of private and public bond market capitalization to GDP (BOND). We prefer using 
STOCK because this variable is better disclosed than BOND for some countries. However, we also check the 
robustness by specifying BOND as the instrumental variable instead of STOCK. The main results are unaltered.   
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openness indicators than the Banking Freedom index.  ECOFREE is a composite index of 10 
indicators ranking policies in the areas of trade, government finances, government 
interventions, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking and finance, 
wages and prices, property rights, regulation and black market activity. The index scores from 
0 to 100 with higher scores indicating policies being more conducive to competition and 
economic freedom.  
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Appendix C. Empirical results 
Table 4. Instrumental variables for bank competition measure. This table presents the first-stage regression between instrumental variables and market power in the banking industry. The 
dependent variable is the Lerner index (LERNER). LERNER is the market power index calculated from the new industrial organization approach following Uchida and Tsutsui (2005). ECOFREE 
is the economic freedom index retrieved from Heritage foundation. RLAW is the rule of law index constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2008). STOCK is the ratio of stock market capitalization to 
gross domestic product( GDP). DEPO is the ratio of total deposits to total assets.  LOAN is the ratio of total loans to total assets. LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans. 
OVERHEAD is the ratio of operating expenses to total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. FOREXG is the growth of foreign exchange reserves. GDPG is the growth rate of real GDP. 
INF is the inflation rate. A constant is included but not reported. The model is estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares method without fixed effects. The t-statistic values are reported in 
parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Muticollinearity problems exist if the VIF test exceeds 10 basis points. 
Explanatory variables Overall period 1997-1999 2007-2009 
    
ECOFREE 0.01466*** 0.00818** 0.05166*** 
 (11.668) (2.4377) (18.589) 
RLAW -0.27981*** -0.01178* -0.45926*** 
 (-13.655) (-0.14593) (-9.7015) 
STOCK 0.07397*** 0.03291** -0.14422*** 
 (7.6635) (0.67054) (-12.584) 
DEPO -0.12652*** 0.13216 -0.09178* 
 (-2.8349) (0.98457) (-1.7115) 
LOAN 0.69381*** 0.97431*** 0.31397*** 
 (13.755) (7.9992) (3.9212) 
LLP 2.1571*** 2.9435*** -0.4023 
 (7.3714) (7.2099) (-0.87172) 
OVERHEAD -3.545*** -6.5794*** -3.1365*** 
 (-5.611) (-4.1668) (-3.7796) 
SIZE 0.02041*** -0.00237 0.01209** 
 (5.2358) (-0.20193) (2.3051) 
FOREXG -0.17133*** -0.09112** -0.01114 
 (-8.1079) (-2.3262) (-0.31504) 
GDPG 3.6965*** -2.6892** 1.2798*** 
 (13.844) (-2.1451) (2.9841) 
INF 1.6274*** 8.2729*** 0.81574*** 
 (12.695) (7.9448) (10.234) 
    
R-square 0.28 0.43 0.39 
F-statistic 149.74*** 58.444*** 51.46*** 
VIF test  1.38 1.78 1.66 
Number of observation 4267 835 870 
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Table 5. General results for the whole period. This table examines the impact of bank competition on capital ratio, risk taking and insolvency risk in banking for overall period. LERNER is the 
market power index. LERNER_SQ is the squared term of LERNER. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. CAR is the total risk-based capital ratio. SDROA (SDROE) is the standard 
deviation of return on assets (equity) calculated from a three-period based rolling window. ZROA (ZROE) is the Z-score index based on ROA (ROE). DEPO is the ratio of total deposits to total 
assets. LOAN is the ratio of total loans to total assets. LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans. OVERHEAD is the ratio of operating expenses to total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of 
total assets. FOREXG is the growth of foreign exchange reserves. GDPG is the growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP). INF is the inflation rate. A constant is included but not 
reported. The model is estimated using the 2SLS method with cross-section and time fixed-effect corrections. Instrumental variables for LERNER consist of ECOFREE (economic freedom), 
RLAW (rule of law) and STOCK (the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP). The t-statistic values are in parentheses. (***) indicates significance at the 1% level, while (**) and (*) indicate 
significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Muticollinearity problems exist if the VIF test exceeds 10 basis points. 
 
 CAR EQTA SDROA SDROE ZROA ZROE 
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
LERNER 0.26108 0.06519** 0.03728 0.06022*** 0.00377* 0.02314*** 0.03351 0.04061*** -112.977*** -49.4404*** -125.489** -28.979* 
 (3.0489) (2.1454) (0.80921) (4.0453) (0.18079) (3.3461) (0.61154) (2.1499) (-2.1615) (-2.9229) (-2.0813) (-1.4239) 
LERNER_SQ 0.28721  0.01336  0.01233  0.05031  41.139  66.9287*  
 (4.3725)  (0.52574)  (0.98311)  (1.4448)  (1.2885)  (1.7064)  
DEPO -0.15001*** -0.12338*** -0.13699*** -0.13479*** -0.00144 0.00042 0.03082*** 0.03807*** -44.269*** -38.067*** -38.597*** -29.236*** 
 (-7.6591) (-9.1627) (-16.2312) (-18.2755) (-0.34585) (0.11431) (2.7494) (3.8731) (-4.1428) (-4.0887) (-3.1392) (-2.7287) 
LOAN -0.08687*** -0.16127*** -0.00023 -0.00492 -0.02144*** -0.02492*** -0.02168 -0.03642*** 41.069*** 29.3521*** 53.0501*** 33.634*** 
 (-3.2028) (-10.5531) (-0.01956) (-0.63902) (-4.0444) (-6.3419) (-1.4527) (-3.4079) (3.0246) (2.9828) (3.2051) (2.8733) 
LLP -0.31453*** -0.08076 -0.19549*** -0.18929*** 0.12179*** 0.13053*** -0.04055 0.02703 -10.512 20.4892 -32.1458 64.157 
 (-3.6176) (-1.6283) (-6.3749) (-6.6471) (7.4682) (9.6005) (-0.5909) (0.54911) (-0.2512) (0.61318) (-0.40612) (1.1871) 
OVERHEAD 0.63031*** 0.63739*** 0.80308*** 0.79943*** 0.14201*** 0.13946*** 0.44489*** 0.44237*** -268.918** -278.792** -322.645** -328.944** 
 (2.5992) (3.6336) (9.9039) (9.8361) (3.1012) (3.0671) (3.4143) (3.4641) (-2.3087) (-2.4581) (-2.2626) (-2.3698) 
SIZE -0.01991*** -0.03159*** -0.03561*** -0.03648*** 0.00068 -0.00021 0.00495 0.00152 6.7247** 3.7786 1.0263 -3.4845 
 (-3.3891) (-8.3502) (-14.2211) (-19.2181) (0.51577) (-0.21356) (1.3939) (0.58639) (1.9886) (1.5541) (0.26229) (-1.2403) 
FOREXG -0.01243 -0.01604** -0.00998*** -0.01031*** -0.00263* -0.00262* -0.00108 -0.00113 12.741*** 12.981*** 6.3467 6.3268 
 (-1.2125) (-2.1715) (-3.2873) (-3.4383) (-1.8088) (-1.8055) (-0.2795) (-0.29758) (3.4497) (3.6061) (1.4963) (1.5319) 
GDPG 0.18987* -0.08576 -0.01864 -0.03672 -0.04001** -0.04853*** -0.06214 -0.09495** 88.268* 60.771 112.665* 68.539 
 (1.6975) (-1.2831) (-0.36707) (-0.97753) (-2.0137) (-2.7315) (-1.1886) (-2.0574) (1.7478) (1.3605) (1.9483) (1.3609) 
INF -0.10482** 0.02738 0.03105 0.03824** 0.00867 0.01526* -0.011627 0.01339 -37.821 -16.319 -33.838 -2.8813 
 (-2.1499) (0.99004) (1.4517) (2.3112) (0.82604) (1.9015) (-0.4179) (0.62756) (-1.4089) (-0.79523) (-1.1306) (-0.12431) 
R-square 0.38 0.67 0.75 0.74 0.31 0.32 0.24 0.27 0.14 0.18 0.09 0.14 
F-statistic 14.494*** 14.208*** 24.405*** 24.449*** 4.81*** 4.817*** 3.709*** 3.711*** 2.686*** 2.686*** 2.114*** 2.111*** 
VIF test 1.97 3.76 4.71 4.66 1.72 1.74 1.57 1.64 1.38 1.45 1.32 1.39 
Number of observation 2826 2826 4220 4220 3944 3994 3852 3852 3901 3901 3774 3774 
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Table 6. General results during the Asian crisis. This table examines the impact of bank competition on capital ratio, risk taking and insolvency risk in banking over the 1997-1999 period. 
LERNER is the market power index. LERNER_SQ is the squared term of LERNER. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. CAR is the total risk-based capital ratio. SDROA (SDROE) is the 
standard deviation of return on assets (equity) calculated from a three-period based rolling window. ZROA (ZROE) is the Z-score index based on ROA (ROE). DEPO is the ratio of total deposits 
to total assets. LOAN is the ratio of total loans to total assets. LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans. OVERHEAD is the ratio of operating expenses to total assets. SIZE is the 
logarithm of total assets. FOREXG is the growth of foreign exchange reserves. GDPG is the growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP). INF is the inflation rate. A constant is included 
but not reported. The model is estimated using the 2SLS method with cross-section and time fixed-effect corrections. Instrumental variables for LERNER consist of ECOFREE (economic 
freedom), RLAW (rule of law) and STOCK (the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP). The t-statistic values are in parentheses. (***) indicates significance at the 1% level, while (**) and 
(*) indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Muticollinearity problems exist if the VIF test exceeds 10 basis points. 
 
 CAR EQTA SDROA SDROE ZROA ZROE 
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
             
LERNER -0.03612 -0.0872*** -0.08792*** -0.04317*** 0.04191 0.01746 -0.01502 -0.03363** 75.063*** 26.991** 25.322* 42.812*** 
 (-0.54607) (-3.9427) (-2.8289) (-4.8516) (2.5531) (1.7399) (-0.29193) (-2.2115) (3.3049) (2.2036) (1.5862) (4.7852) 
LERNER_SQ -0.02459  0.02155  -0.01144  -0.00918  -22.386**  8.5259**  
 (-0.81903)  (1.5054)  (-1.6109)  (-0.37896)  (-4.0733)  (2.0324)  
DEPO -0.04228 -0.06817 -0.21102*** -0.19562*** -0.02304 -0.02968 -0.02931 -0.03406 -12.428 -25.617 -66.877 -62.369 
 (-0.60703) (-1.0938) (-7.6809) (-7.8139) (-0.79088) (-1.0638) (-0.62561) (-0.75725) (-0.48301) (-1.1032) (-1.4772) (-1.3251) 
LOAN -0.16777*** -0.15609*** 0.06028*** 0.04759*** -0.10414*** -0.09827*** -0.09151*** -0.08651*** 7.7527 19.458 90.642*** 85.911*** 
 (-3.4566) (-3.3502) (3.2175) (2.8969) (-2.7838) (-2.6941) (-2.8101) (-2.9153) (0.52535) (1.1866) (6.2249) (6.5755) 
LLP 0.28089** 0.28817** 0.06464** 0.06373** 0.10306** 0.10396** 0.01345 0.00907 -37.299 -35.356 -25.197 -21.647 
 (2.5241) (2.5868) (2.0983) (2.1076) (2.1798) (2.1986) (0.23906) (0.16521) (-1.4193) (-1.6026) (-0.45802) (-0.39737) 
OVERHEAD 0.40713 0.31953 0.05805 0.07011 0.18754 0.17326 -0.19957 -0.20363 -77.945 -104.57 599.075*** 604.368*** 
 (0.54231) (0.42819) (0.23641) (0.29089) (0.75206) (0.69644) (-0.51872) (-0.53117) (-0.55467) (-0.66832) (4.8711) (5.1612) 
SIZE -0.08222*** -0.07421*** -0.04325*** -0.05007*** -0.02256*** -0.01883** -0.06269*** -0.05949*** 2.9071 10.214 41.165*** 38.194*** 
 (-3.7591) (-3.7768) (-4.9743) (-6.8767) (-2.8251) (-2.2784) (-3.9559) (-4.4479) (0.26816) 1.2235 (3.4246) (3.1684) 
FOREXG 0.00999 0.01336 0.00722* 0.00634* -0.00549** -0.00503* 0.02127*** 0.02159*** 2.9392 3.8541* -3.5932*** -3.8734*** 
 (0.88514) (1.2641) (1.8868) (1.7079) (-2.0887) (-1.9601) (3.4611) (3.5596) (1.2434) (1.9221) (-3.5472) (-2.9309) 
GDPG 0.53519* 0.62862** 0.33723** 0.21291* -0.46761*** -0.39286*** 0.03989 0.09815 -567.002*** -417.979* -259.567*** -316.956*** 
 (1.7733) (2.2403) (2.2061) (1.6857) (-3.9491) (-3.6201) (0.14843) (0.44661) (-4.6389) (-1.8958) (-1.7365) (-3.2719) 
INF -2.0498*** -2.2975*** -0.88642*** -0.67546*** 0.69188*** 0.57758*** -0.10748 -0.18638 259.762 38.809 474.741 549.659* 
 (-3.6286) (-4.7959) (-4.0291) (-4.0564) (3.4924) (2.9446) (-0.30779) (-0.66693) (0.94869) (0.18669) (1.4935) (1.8835) 
             
R-square 0.78 0.78 0.87 0.87 0.51 0.51 0.61 0.61 0.37 0.34 0.49 0.49 
F-statistic 8.6654*** 8.7084*** 18.126*** 18.103*** 3.674*** 3.683*** 4.349*** 4.371*** 2.224*** 2.224*** 2.893*** 2.907*** 
VIF test 7.92 6.90 4.18 3.35 3.74 3.77 4.89 4.91 2.96 2.85 3.65 3.69 
Number of Observation 492 492 813 813 807 807 761 761 797 797 747 747 
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Table 7. General results during the global credit crisis. This table examines the impact of bank competition on capital ratio, risk taking and insolvency risk in banking over the 2007-2009 
period. LERNER is the market power index. LERNER_SQ is the squared term of LERNER. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. CAR is the total risk-based capital ratio. SDROA 
(SDROE) is the standard deviation of return on assets (equity) calculated from a three-period based rolling window. ZROA (ZROE) is the Z-score index based on ROA (ROE). DEPO is the ratio 
of total deposits to total assets. LOAN is the ratio of total loans to total assets. LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans. OVERHEAD is the ratio of operating expenses to total assets. 
SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. FOREXG is the growth of foreign exchange reserves. GDPG is the growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP). INF is the inflation rate. A constant is 
included but not reported. The model is estimated using the 2SLS method with cross-section and time fixed-effect corrections. Instrumental variables for LERNER consist of ECOFREE 
(economic freedom), RLAW (rule of law) and STOCK (the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP). The t-statistic values are in parentheses. (***) indicates significance at the 1% level, 
while (**) and (*) indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Muticollinearity problems exist if the VIF test exceeds 10 basis points. 
 
 CAR EQTA SDROA SDROE ZROA ZROE 
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
             
LERNER 0.23072*** 0.07594** 0.16163** 0.00217 -0.01047 -0.00188 -0.03648 0.05451* -1.5238 -86.773** 69.1702 -95.079* 
 (5.1297) (2.1448) (2.2542) (0.14047) (-1.2574) (-0.42507) (-0.42597) (1.8207) (-0.01204) (-2.3025) (0.58984) (-1.4945) 
LERNER_SQ -0.35738  -0.30598  0.01686  0.17549  -163.47  -315.425  
 (-3.2456)  (-2.0838)  (1.5818)  (1.3207)  (-0.83739)  (-1.0305)  
DEPO -0.17697*** -0.16306*** -0.06448*** -0.06027*** 0.00438* 0.00426* 0.02801 0.02935*** -8.1769 -7.7557 6.735 3.9859 
 (-9.7056) (-9.9025) (-8.9314) (-13.687) (1.44601) (1.8219) (1.0298) (4.8804) (-0.20511) (-0.42143) (0.99648) (0.88062) 
LOAN -0.22033*** -0.21739*** -0.02506*** -0.03983*** 0.00382 0.00508* -0.02096 -0.01023** -37.658 -50.427 -9.6142 -28.979 
 (-5.5628) (-7.5151) (-12.259) (-5.2298) (0.85639) (1.8733) (-0.64373) (-2.2428) (-0.77249) (-1.145) (-0.97742) (-0.9962) 
LLP -0.30159 -0.09641 -0.26402*** -0.12018*** 0.04856*** 0.04091*** 0.38361*** 0.30631 -273.85 -200.44*** -399.23*** -263.99*** 
 (-1.1227) (-0.56101) (-5.7377) (-4.1076) (1.2428) (4.0031) (2.9181) (1.3839) (-1.4049) (-6.2084) (-4.0919) (-33.207) 
OVERHEAD 0.27433 0.81341* 1.0609*** 1.5423*** 0.11359*** 0.07947*** 1.4655*** 1.1063*** -956.12 -621.08*** -612.11* 41.879 
 (0.50714) (1.6827) (2.9646) (4.2294) (1.6149) (2.6528) (3.3303) (3.5185) (-1.4679) (-3.1302) (-1.8972) (0.23033) 
SIZE -0.05591** -0.04559*** -0.03166 -0.02289* 0.000131 -0.00045 0.00892 0.00353 -13.354 -7.6367*** 12.206 22.274* 
 (-2.4321) (-3.5616) (-1.4421) (-1.8748) (0.10856) (-0.55676) (0.86943) (1.4008) (-0.85847) (-3.6017) (0.78316) (1.8159) 
FOREXG 0.00283 0.00995* -0.00303 -0.00173 0.00068 0.00058 0.00552 0.0044 0.97656 1.9086 -6.2239 -4.1396 
 (0.12478) (1.9114) (-0.33566) (-0.27199) (1.0132) (0.9678) (0.79333) (0.99981) (0.09528) (0.57795) (-0.67814) (-0.62283) 
GDPG -0.13758 0.05565 0.04677 0.24758*** -0.01401 -0.02598** 0.00101 -0.12924 188.78 305.84** 12.491 252.11*** 
 (-0.77936) (0.35826) (0.41596) (3.5365) (-1.0215) (-2.3411) (0.00627) (-0.80418) (0.80102) (2.2844) (0.10346) (2.6639) 
INF 0.01399 0.03816 0.01835 0.03091* -0.00259 -0.00322 -0.03092 -0.03753*** 99.907*** 105.85*** 33.595*** 46.058*** 
 (0.38483) (0.95691) (1.1014) (1.8774) (-1.6171) (-1.6098) (-1.3155) (-3.5793) (2.8653) (3.5031) (2.6231) (5.6889) 
                          
R-square 0.81 0.86 0.85 0.89 0.74 0.76 0.44 0.52 0.26 0.29 0.14 0.25 
F-statistic 14.711*** 14.509*** 21.548*** 21.139*** 8.346*** 8.341*** 3.622*** 3.618*** 1.978*** 1.983*** 1.865*** 1.856*** 
VIF test 9.45 9.29 5.91 6.37 6.70 7.42 3.19 3.68 2.39 2.52 2.08 2.39 
Number of Observation 721 721 868 868 846 846 834 834 837 837 821 821 
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Table 8. The role of too-big-to-fail subsidies for overall period. This table examines the influence of systematic size of banking on the competition-stability nexus for overall period. LERNER 
is the market power index. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. CAR is the total risk-based capital ratio. SDROA (SDROE) is the standard deviation of return on assets (equity) 
calculated from a three-period based rolling window. ZROA (ZROE) is the Z-score index based on ROA (ROE). DEPO is the ratio of total deposits to total assets. LOAN is the ratio of total loans 
to total assets. LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans. OVERHEAD is the ratio of operating expenses to total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. FOREXG is the growth of 
foreign exchange reserves. GDPG is the growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP). INF is the inflation rate. TBTS is the ratio of three largest banks‟ total assets to GDP. A constant is 
included but not reported. The model is estimated using the 2SLS method with cross-section and time fixed-effect corrections. Instrumental variables for LERNER consist of ECOFREE 
(economic freedom), RLAW (rule of law) and STOCK (the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP). The t-statistic values are in parentheses. (***) indicates significance at the 1% level, 
while (**) and (*) indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Muticollinearity problems exist if VIF test exceeds 10 basis points. 
 
Explanatory variables CAR EQTA SDROA SDROE ZROA ZROE 
       
LERNER 0.15873*** 0.06604*** 0.02211*** 0.06096*** -13.7445* 22.152 
 (4.7671) (4.1138) (2.6504) (2.6061) (-0.69552) (0.52431) 
LERNER*TBTS -0.17963*** -0.08155*** -0.03606** -0.13561*** -22.758 -29.268 
 (-4.7553) (-2.9457) (-2.452) (-3.476) (-0.62876) (-0.41864) 
DEPO -0.13228*** -0.14962*** -0.000589 0.03559*** -32.712*** -25.769** 
 (-9.2744) (-20.997) (-0.15242) (3.4071) (-3.6952) (-2.2855) 
LOAN -0.16281*** 0.00223 -0.02746*** -0.03992*** 19.587** 26.847*** 
 (-10.142) (0.29779) (-6.5721) (-3.4924) (1.9717) (3.4727) 
LLP -0.12157** -0.17958*** 0.13831*** 0.03249 -22.168 -23.546 
 (-2.4229) (-6.8463) (10.221) (0.64965) (-0.80108) (-0.35727) 
OVERHEAD 0.49439*** 0.74376*** 0.13693*** 0.44687*** -271.24*** -355.02*** 
 (2.7301) (9.4357) (2.8634) (3.2817) (-2.8195) (-2.7976) 
SIZE -0.03811*** -0.03781*** -0.000381 0.00068 2.2208 -4.3351** 
 (-9.1329) (-18.859) (-0.34587) (0.23047) (0.75392) (-2.1694) 
FOREXG -0.00268 -0.00358 0.00004 0.00689 10.671*** 4.4534 
 (-0.34451) (-1.1845) (0.02501) (1.6159) (2.7602) (0.83858) 
GDPG 0.15161* 0.08132 -0.00061 0.05074 32.749 72.285 
 (1.7427) (1.6292) (-0.02531) (0.80049) (0.57483) (0.70195) 
INF -0.02343 0.00936 0.02173* 0.01963 -12.059 -11.501 
 (-0.52902) (0.42414) (1.9003) (0.6359) (-0.44426) (-0.41351) 
TBTS 0.01781 0.04441*** 0.02643*** 0.06461*** -25.088** -47.051*** 
 (-4.7553) (5.2106) (5.6628) (5.0792) (-2.1391) (-3.2823) 
              
R-square 0.68 0.76 0.34 0.26 0.21 0.16 
F-statistic 14.582*** 23.369*** 5.081*** 3.973*** 2.748*** 2.211*** 
VIF test 3.86 5.09 1.84 1.63 1.49 1.42 
Number of Observation 2826 4220 3994 3852 3901 3774 
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Table 9. The Asian crisis and too-big-to fail subsidies. The influence of systematic size of banking on the competition-stability nexus over the 1997-1999 period. LERNER is the market power 
index. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. CAR is the total risk-based capital ratio. SDROA (SDROE) is the standard deviation of return on assets (equity) calculated from a three-
period based rolling window. ZROA (ZROE) is the Z-score index based on ROA (ROE). DEPO is the ratio of total deposits to total assets. LOAN is the ratio of total loans to total assets. LLP is 
the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans. OVERHEAD is the ratio of operating expenses to total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. FOREXG is the growth of foreign exchange 
reserves. GDPG is the growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP). INF is the inflation rate. TBTS is the ratio of three largest banks‟ total assets to GDP. A constant is included but not 
reported. The model is estimated using the 2SLS method with cross-section and time fixed-effect corrections. Instrumental variables for LERNER consist of ECOFREE (economic freedom), 
RLAW (rule of law) and STOCK (the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP). The t-statistic values are in parentheses. (***) indicates significance at the 1% level, while (**) and (*) indicate 
significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Muticollinearity problems exist if VIF test exceeds 10 basis points. 
 
Explanatory variables CAR EQTA SDROA SDROE ZROA ZROE 
       
LERNER -0.11305** -0.01413 -0.01023* -0.02626** 24.105*** 59.165*** 
 (-2.4069) (-0.44649) (-0.19222) (-2.5404) (6.2099) (3.689) 
LERNER*TBTS 0.05616 -0.21879*** 0.33649*** 0.0187 68.251 -95.295 
 (0.21881) (-4.5208) (8.4238) (0.14537) (0.85577) (-1.0259) 
DEPO -0.03346 -0.1894*** -0.02676 -0.02859 -25.861 -74.856 
 (-0.42584) (-9.8558) (-0.92299) (-0.87663) (-1.0106) (-1.3102) 
LOAN -0.16844*** 0.04657 -0.07523 -0.07778*** 29.321** 89.019*** 
 (-3.4209) (1.4082) (-1.3521) (-9.9026) (2.4443) (5.9636) 
LLP 0.28284 0.08296 0.07918 0.00415 -38.157 -5.0269 
 (1.4924) (1.3793) (0.85658) (0.08705) (-1.5699) (-0.11144) 
OVERHEAD 0.46927 0.11152 0.01812 -0.25461 -121.794 647.2*** 
 (0.61903) (0.28509) (0.07634) (-1.2718) (-0.64495) (8.4798) 
SIZE -0.08002** -0.03133*** -0.0515*** -0.06546*** 4.8601 50.581*** 
 (-2.0639) (-4.9906) (-7.3885) (-2.9508) (0.31528) (2.6975) 
FOREXG 0.00922 0.01054** -0.01315*** 0.02109*** 1.8871 -2.3124 
 (0.52786) (2.3453) (-3.2231) (3.1871) (0.53683) (-1.2779) 
GDPG 0.93757 0.56373 -1.1767 -0.13529 -643.14*** -282.83*** 
 (0.79523) (0.91224) (-1.5039) (-0.33993) (-5.0017) (-4.4134) 
INF -2.6819*** -0.31906 0.05153 -0.28919 -15.253 783.08*** 
 (-4.5737) (-1.1651) (0.22076) (-1.2702) (-0.09359) (3.4252) 
TBTS -0.18834 -0.23132 0.53144* 0.16446 149.71 -13.189 
 (-0.32027) (-1.0389) (1.6925) (0.87233) (0.78535) (-0.13575) 
              
R-square 0.79 0.84 0.32 0.62 0.33 0.44 
F-statistic 8.665*** 17.773*** 4.018*** 4.527*** 2.092*** 2.732*** 
VIF test 9.32 9.17 2.65 5.01 2.86 3.63 
Number of Observation 492 813 807 761 797 747 
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Table 10. The global credit crisis and too-big-to fail subsidies. The influence of systematic size of banking on the competition-stability nexus over the 2007-2009 period. LERNER is the 
market power index. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. CAR is the total risk-based capital ratio. SDROA (SDROE) is the standard deviation of return on assets (equity) calculated 
from a three-period based rolling window. ZROA (ZROE) is the Z-score index based on ROA (ROE). DEPO is the ratio of total deposits to total assets. LOAN is the ratio of total loans to total 
assets. LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans. OVERHEAD is the ratio of operating expenses to total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. FOREXG is the growth of foreign 
exchange reserves. GDPG is the growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP). INF is the inflation rate. TBTS is the ratio of three largest banks‟ total assets to GDP. A constant is included 
but not reported. The model is estimated using the 2SLS method with cross-section and time fixed-effect corrections. Instrumental variables for LERNER consist of ECOFREE (economic 
freedom), RLAW (rule of law) and STOCK (the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP). The t-statistic values are in parentheses. (***) indicates significance at the 1% level, while (**) and 
(*) indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Muticollinearity problems exist if VIF test exceeds 10 basis points. 
Explanatory variables CAR EQTA SDROA SDROE ZROA ZROE 
       
LERNER -0.02208 -0.25941 0.02532 0.39182* -474.79* -642.088* 
 (-0.04919) (-1.3867) (1.0109) (1.5504) (-1.2058) (-1.5111) 
LERNER*TBTS 0.14692 0.50541* -0.04767 -0.66839* 781.72 1080.94* 
 (0.23015) (1.8566) (-1.3188) (-1.8402) (1.3598) (1.7812) 
DEPO -0.12593*** -0.06001*** 0.00385 0.03169 6.9164 1.1599 
 (-4.8943) (-2.7439) (1.3283) (1.0676) (0.15608) (0.02375) 
LOAN -0.13913 0.01689 0.00361 -0.02898 -14.763 51.592 
 (-1.5012) (0.64076) (1.0053) (-0.79339) (-0.26823) (0.81968) 
LLP -0.10334 -0.05478 0.03859*** 0.23854** -125.71 -72.503 
 (-0.73781) (-0.61102) (3.2629) (1.9902) (-0.69456) (-0.34092) 
OVERHEAD -0.42131 0.09585 0.13119** 1.7879*** -1515.33* -1174.52 
 (-0.51268) (0.25853) (2.5842) (3.5109) (-1.9452) (-1.3507) 
SIZE -0.05702*** -0.06338*** 0.00084 0.02692** -40.629** -10.181 
 (-4.7408) (-7.1775) (0.70333) (2.2114) (-2.2296) (-0.49035) 
FOREXG -0.0021 -0.00058 0.00086 0.00167 0.65933 3.6167 
 (-0.28906) (-0.08039) (0.89516) (0.17039) (0.04494) (0.22426) 
GDPG 0.10504 0.54185** -0.0651** -0.69073** 908.22* 1107.89** 
 (0.21156) (2.4112) (-2.1986) (-2.3098) (1.9507) (2.2384) 
INF 0.15375 0.03486 -0.01717 -0.19436* 279.99* 235.88 
 (0.90258) (0.43107) (-1.6062) (-1.7929) (1.6826) (1.3152) 
TBTS -0.13632 -0.72547* 0.07362 1.1269** -1252.16* -1749.8** 
 (-0.16535) (-2.1256) (1.6157) (2.449) (-1.7125) (-2.2623) 
              
R-square 0.87 0.88 0.73 0.49 0.26 0.12 
F-statistic 16.636*** 23.869*** 8.476*** 3.966*** 2.165*** 1.731*** 
VIF test 2.78 5.65 7.13 3.70 2.51 2.43 
Number of Observation 721 868 846 834 837 821 
 
